‘Land-grabbing’ in Africa – a complex issue
Foreign intervention in the form of owning African land is a vast and complex subject. This complexity is increased by the difficulty of accessing accurate information and the need to understand the issue in its context. Two important sources of information on the topic are a 2009 report published by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED) entitled ‘Land grab or development opportunity?: Agricultural investment and international land deals in Africa’ and a 2011 Oxfam report ‘Land Grabbing in Africa: A review of impacts and possible policy responses’. The former was based on research in 5 countries (Ethiopia, Ghana, Madagascar, Mali and Sudan) carried out over a period of 5 months covering deals greater than 1000 hectares (a hectare is roughly the size of a football field) over the time frame of 2004-2009. The latter was compiled in 2011 by Tinyade Kachika, a senior legal researcher at Oxfam.
The key picture which emerges from the FAO/IIED report is that data on land acquisitions in Africa is scarce and often of limited reliability and therefore conclusions drawn from the study need to be treated with some caution. Nevertheless a picture is emerging of large-scale land acquisitions in Africa. The key features of this process include a significant amount of land being affected with some 2.5 million hectares of land allocated in the five study countries between 2004 and 2009. In addition, there is a rise in land-based investment although large-scale claims involving land of over 1000 hectares remains a small proportion of total suitable land in any one country. Furthermore, most of the remaining suitable land is already under use or claim, often by local people, and pressure is growing on higher value lands, such as, those with irrigation potential or closer to markets. There also appears to be an increase in the size of single land acquisitions, for example, there was a 452,500 hectare biofuel project in Madagascar, a 150,000 hectare livestock project in Ethiopia and a 100,000 hectare irrigation project in Mali. Another emerging feature appeared to be the dominance of the private sector in such land deals as well as the dominance of foreign investors, although domestic investors also seemed to be playing a major role.
The key picture which emerges from the FAO/IIED report is that data on land acquisitions in Africa is scarce and often of limited reliability and therefore conclusions drawn from the study need to be treated with some caution. Nevertheless a picture is emerging of large-scale land acquisitions in Africa. The key features of this process include a significant amount of land being affected with some 2.5 million hectares of land allocated in the five study countries between 2004 and 2009. In addition, there is a rise in land-based investment although large-scale claims involving land of over 1000 hectares remains a small proportion of total suitable land in any one country. Furthermore, most of the remaining suitable land is already under use or claim, often by local people, and pressure is growing on higher value lands, such as, those with irrigation potential or closer to markets. There also appears to be an increase in the size of single land acquisitions, for example, there was a 452,500 hectare biofuel project in Madagascar, a 150,000 hectare livestock project in Ethiopia and a 100,000 hectare irrigation project in Mali. Another emerging feature appeared to be the dominance of the private sector in such land deals as well as the dominance of foreign investors, although domestic investors also seemed to be playing a major role.
Publicity for an anti 'land-grab' conference in South Africa in 2013
The Oxfam study also appears to show very high levels of activity with regard to land deals in Africa and argues that, in most cases, the land is not marginal as governments and investors have claimed. It notes that evidence in 2009 indicated that land deals in Ethiopia involved an estimated 602,760 hectares; in Ghana 452,000 hectares and in Mali 162,580 hectares. These land deals are driven by government policies which have the stated intention of attracting investment, particularly foreign direct investment with the aim of contributing to the economic development of the country. For example, the Oxfam report points out that the Mozambican government is promoting the country as a southern African agro fuel hub, and in 2007 alone, agro fuel investors in Mozambique applied for rights to close to 5 million hectares; Senegal's Minister for Bio fuels and Renewable Energy confirmed that there were interests by investors to establish an irrigated agricultural zone ranging from 60,000 to 600,000 hectares for the production of ethanol in the country and in 2008, it was reported that investors in Tanzania were interested in producing bio-mass for either ethanol or bio-diesel on land measuring from 30,000 to 2,000,000 acres. The report further argues that as result of such deals rural communities are dispossessed of land that they have routinely used for ages in order to accommodate domestic policy decisions promoting foreign agricultural investments. In addition, it states that there is also evidence that the validity of some contracts directly entered into between foreign investors and rural communities has been in doubt and concludes that this therefore merits labelling many land deals as "land grabbing".
On the other hand, some African governments complain that the ‘land grabbing’ issue is being deliberately fanned by some ‘development charities’ and ‘non-governmental organisations (NGOs)’ in order to prevent African countries from developing economically, since they have a vested interest in maintaining poverty in Africa. For example in 2013, the Ethiopian government issued a briefing paper to address many of the claims around ‘land grabbing’. The briefing paper states that all development activities by the government are immediately classified as “human rights violations” by the advocacy groups which themselves have a vested interest in making a living by allegedly making a contribution to poverty alleviation measures through getting funding from various donors. It is interesting to note that the ‘aid budgets’ of some of these donor countries dwarf the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of many African countries. For example, the 2016 USAID budget was US$27.2 billion which compared with a 2016 GDP of US $25 billion for Uganda, $15 billion for Zimbabwe, and $13billion for Mozambique. Furthermore the paper states that these groups are opposed to development in countries like Ethiopia because this will eliminate their reason for being. A further concern is that some of these ‘development charities’ are in fact linked to the secret services of the donor countries which use them to gather intelligence. As a consequence, their activities have been banned in some African countries. The Ethiopian government argues that all its land deals must meet strict criteria. First, land cannot be sold outright but can only be leased, secondly only land that is sparsely populated can be used and all deals must include a 40/60 split, whereby at least 40% of the produce must be for the local market whereas 60% can be exported. In addition, local labour must be used in the project and the government encourages the transfer of technology in these processes. The African Union has established a framework for land acquisition which includes many of the caveats the Ethiopian government outlined in its briefing paper.
Independent researchers note that NGOs like the Oakland Institute do act in the way suggested by the Ethiopian government. However, although they agree that the approach of the NGOs would prevent any form of national development since any attempt to build an agro-processing industry would be discredited as ‘land grabbing’, they, nevertheless, argue that the situation with regard to such land deals in Ethiopia itself remains complex. They point out that land policy in Ethiopia is based on a zoning system. Land which is zoned for peasant use is subject to redistribution according to the needs of each peasant household. However, land which is not included in the peasant use zone is available for land deals and accounts suggest that large tracts are taken out of peasant-use sector and allocated to foreign investors and that in some areas peasant farmers are losing their best lands to this. They further argue that only leasing land to foreign investors and not selling it is not particularly significant, since in many African countries land sales do take place as a lease of 25 or 50 years for foreign investors and 90 years for housing. In any event, they caution against seeing the Ethiopian approach as a model for the rest of Africa. They argue instead that in evaluating such land deals, it is necessary to have a clear picture of what is meant by development by outlining the nature of this development, the class alliances it serves and the nature of the relations with foreign capital.
Land grabbing is undoubtedly one of the most hotly contested issues in the geopolitics of Africa, partly because comparatively large sections of Africa’s population are still closely connected to agricultural production whether on a subsistence basis or on a larger commercial scale so any threat to the people’s means of lively hood has serious potential implications. The case of ZanuPF inspired land reclamation from big land owners with titles dating back to the colonial era in Zimbabwe is often cited in the western press from the perspective that this has been a failed project but the fact that there are conflicting interests at play who have definite agendas in pushing one or other narrative is clear to see.
On the other hand, some African governments complain that the ‘land grabbing’ issue is being deliberately fanned by some ‘development charities’ and ‘non-governmental organisations (NGOs)’ in order to prevent African countries from developing economically, since they have a vested interest in maintaining poverty in Africa. For example in 2013, the Ethiopian government issued a briefing paper to address many of the claims around ‘land grabbing’. The briefing paper states that all development activities by the government are immediately classified as “human rights violations” by the advocacy groups which themselves have a vested interest in making a living by allegedly making a contribution to poverty alleviation measures through getting funding from various donors. It is interesting to note that the ‘aid budgets’ of some of these donor countries dwarf the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of many African countries. For example, the 2016 USAID budget was US$27.2 billion which compared with a 2016 GDP of US $25 billion for Uganda, $15 billion for Zimbabwe, and $13billion for Mozambique. Furthermore the paper states that these groups are opposed to development in countries like Ethiopia because this will eliminate their reason for being. A further concern is that some of these ‘development charities’ are in fact linked to the secret services of the donor countries which use them to gather intelligence. As a consequence, their activities have been banned in some African countries. The Ethiopian government argues that all its land deals must meet strict criteria. First, land cannot be sold outright but can only be leased, secondly only land that is sparsely populated can be used and all deals must include a 40/60 split, whereby at least 40% of the produce must be for the local market whereas 60% can be exported. In addition, local labour must be used in the project and the government encourages the transfer of technology in these processes. The African Union has established a framework for land acquisition which includes many of the caveats the Ethiopian government outlined in its briefing paper.
Independent researchers note that NGOs like the Oakland Institute do act in the way suggested by the Ethiopian government. However, although they agree that the approach of the NGOs would prevent any form of national development since any attempt to build an agro-processing industry would be discredited as ‘land grabbing’, they, nevertheless, argue that the situation with regard to such land deals in Ethiopia itself remains complex. They point out that land policy in Ethiopia is based on a zoning system. Land which is zoned for peasant use is subject to redistribution according to the needs of each peasant household. However, land which is not included in the peasant use zone is available for land deals and accounts suggest that large tracts are taken out of peasant-use sector and allocated to foreign investors and that in some areas peasant farmers are losing their best lands to this. They further argue that only leasing land to foreign investors and not selling it is not particularly significant, since in many African countries land sales do take place as a lease of 25 or 50 years for foreign investors and 90 years for housing. In any event, they caution against seeing the Ethiopian approach as a model for the rest of Africa. They argue instead that in evaluating such land deals, it is necessary to have a clear picture of what is meant by development by outlining the nature of this development, the class alliances it serves and the nature of the relations with foreign capital.
Land grabbing is undoubtedly one of the most hotly contested issues in the geopolitics of Africa, partly because comparatively large sections of Africa’s population are still closely connected to agricultural production whether on a subsistence basis or on a larger commercial scale so any threat to the people’s means of lively hood has serious potential implications. The case of ZanuPF inspired land reclamation from big land owners with titles dating back to the colonial era in Zimbabwe is often cited in the western press from the perspective that this has been a failed project but the fact that there are conflicting interests at play who have definite agendas in pushing one or other narrative is clear to see.
